India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: An Overview

This is an extract from the 2021 edition of GRR's the Asia-Pacific Restructuring Review. The whole publication is available here.

In summary

This overview contains a summary of the most significant developments in Indian insolvency and bankruptcy law between July 2019 and August 2020, which have had an impact on the design of law and its implementation. Where possible, the legislative changes and the case law surrounding this have been discussed simultaneously to give the reader an understanding of the letter of the law and its interpretation. Some of the trend-setting judgments have been dealt with subsequently, and there is also a small overview of the changes brought about as a result of the covid-19 pandemic. The overview also provides a brief summary of legislative changes in the pipeline, such as group insolvency and cross-border insolvency.

Discussion points

Referenced in this article

Introduction

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC or the Code) was intended to be a transformative piece of legislation. It sought revolutionary and cultural transformation in the insolvency and bankruptcy landscape, by (i) creating a comprehensive code for insolvency and bankruptcy for corporates and individuals, (ii) establishing a new architecture, consisting of a committee of creditors (COC) and dedicated adjudicating authorities (AA) for insolvency resolution and liquidation, and (iii) bringing judicial discipline in the process.

Each of the three elements was intended to address the problems that affected the bankruptcy regime in India. Although the Companies Act 1956 and the Companies Act 2013 contained provisions for winding up companies, they were found inadequate. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985 (SICA), which provided an insolvency resolution framework for sick industrial undertakings, had failed to deliver. The insolvency and bankruptcy regime for individuals was based on colonial legislation and needed to be revamped to be in sync with the 21st century. In this context, the IBC was path-breaking. Besides prescribing a legislative framework for insolvency resolution and bankruptcy, the Code established the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) as the regulator, which can proactively respond to the changing realities through its regulatory powers. The IBC has succeeded in establishing a distinct jurisprudence for insolvency resolution. The government and the IBBI have also been proactive in clarifying and resolving issues as and when they appear through the implementation of the legislation. This explains frequent amendments to both the IBC and various regulations issued under it. However, the fact that the IBC is not yet fully operational despite four years of its enactment raises a few red flags on its report card.

The National Companies Law Tribunal (NCLT), which existed as a forum for adjudication of disputes for companies, became the AA for corporate insolvency resolution and liquidation. Since the IBC has come into force, the NCLT has become pre-eminently a forum for insolvency resolution and liquidation, with its caseload predominantly consisting of insolvency cases. As per the annual report of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for the financial year 2019–2020, a total of 19,733 fresh cases were filed at various benches of the NCLT, of which 12,089 were filed under the IBC. Similarly, of the total 13,884 cases disposed off by various NCLT benches, 7,365 were under the IBC. A large caseload, particularly at the NCLT benches in Delhi and Mumbai, has often led to delays in adjudication of disputes. However, with new NCLT benches set up across various states and an increase in bench strength at the Delhi and Mumbai benches, the situation is likely to improve.

Enforcing judicial discipline in insolvency resolution was one of the principle objectives of the IBC. In this respect, the Code has certainly fared much better than its predecessor, SICA; however, many argue that its record is far from satisfactory. The IBC imposed a strict timeline of 180 days for the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), which is extendable by another 90 days, at the discretion of the AA. This was further extended to 330 days through an amendment to the IBC in 2019. However, depending on the data one relies upon, the average time taken for resolution under the IBC is 340 to 394 days. In either case, the average time taken is in excess of the maximum 330-day timeline prescribed under the Code. Many cases take much longer (Essar Steel’s CIRP took as many as 866 days to complete). Further, as per the data released by the IBBI, since the provisions regarding the CIRP came into effect on 1 December 2016, only 5.85 per cent of cases have resulted in approval of resolution plans, while approximately 24 per cent have resulted in liquidation. In most cases the disruption of timelines is attributable to judicial interventions. The courts have been liberal in interpreting the boundaries set by the timelines, which has led to such timelines being construed as merely advisory in nature. The government and Parliament’s attempt to fix the timelines have been repeatedly thwarted by the courts.

The government has largely played a constructive role in facilitating the implementation of the IBC. It has successfully aligned the banking regulator, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), to push the banking system into using the IBC as the principal mechanism for resolving debt. This approach has predictably received certain setbacks with the onset of covid-19. Where challenges have been faced in IBC implementation, the government and the IBBI have stepped in to amend the legislation and the regulations. While, by and large, the amendments have made the implementation smoother, there have been instances where frequent amendments have caused some confusion.

Recent legislative amendments

The IBC is perhaps the most frequently amended legislation in recent years, and some of the changes were necessary to avoid unintended consequences. In addition to the legislative changes regarding the covid-19 situation, between July 2019 and August 2020 there were two broad sets of amendments to the IBC, as well as various amendments to the underlying regulations.

The 2019 Amendment

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2019 (the 2019 Amendment) came in the context of the following problems that were being faced in the implementation of the IBC:

These concerns were addressed by the 2019 Amendment as follows:

The First 2020 Amendment

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2020 (the First 2020 Amendment) followed the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance 2019. The key constraints that the First 2020 Amendment removed are as follows:

Key regulatory changes

While the IBC contemplates the insolvency and bankruptcy regime for individuals, it has not been fully notified as yet. The same was notified in a limited manner with effect from 1 December 2019, insofar as it applies to personal guarantors of corporate debtors. To give effect to the provisions, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules 2019 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Bankruptcy Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Regulations 2019 were also notified. This allowed creditors to initiate and maintain proceedings against both the corporate debtor and the guarantor of the corporate debtor in the NCLT. However, previously, in the case of Vishnu Kumar Agarwal v Piramal Enterprises Limited, the NCLAT had held that if an insolvency proceeding under section 7 of the IBC has been admitted against the principal borrower, then a second application by the same creditor on the same claim cannot be maintained against the guarantor. This has caused some confusion as to whether simultaneous proceedings against the corporate debtor and the personal guarantor can continue for the same claim.

As per a recent amendment to the CIRP Regulations, the COC is now required to simultaneously vote on all resolution plans received by the IRP that comply with the requirements of the CIRP Regulations and the IBC. If only one plan is received, it shall be considered approved by the COC if it receives 66 per cent of the votes. If there is more than one plan, the plan that receives 66 per cent of the votes shall be considered approved, failing which the plan that receives the highest votes shall be voted on again. This process gives the COC the ability to simultaneously examine various plans, as opposed to voting on plans individually, which may potentially lead to rejection of all plans. This is likely to make the process more efficient.

Changes related to covid-19

Like governments in many other countries, the Indian government has also brought about changes to mitigate the effects of covid-19 on corporations. On 5 June 2020, the government promulgated the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Amendment) Ordinance 2020 (the Suspension Ordinance). The Suspension Ordinance has suspended section 7 (initiation of insolvency resolution by a financial creditor), section 9 (initiation of insolvency resolution by an operational creditor) and section 10 (initiation of insolvency resolution by a corporate debtor itself) of the IBC for six months (extendable to one year) (the Suspension Period) in respect of any default that occurred after 25 March 2020.

The Suspension Ordinance has had its critics. Some argue that the language leaves much scope for improvement. The proviso to the newly inserted section 10A of the IBC states that no application for the initiation of the CIRP shall ever be filed in respect of a default that occurred during the Suspension Period. The draft indicates that a default occurring after 25 March 2020 would be excused. This may potentially result in worsening the crisis for banks and other stakeholders that may not be able to pursue the remedy under the IBC for defaults during the Suspension Period.

Another significant consequence of the Suspension Ordinance is that although the CIRP cannot be initiated against the corporate debtor, the insolvency resolution process under the Code can be initiated against personal guarantors of such corporate debtors. It is difficult to think of any reason why a default arising from the extraordinary situation of the covid-19 pandemic has been excused for corporate debtors but not personal guarantors.

In addition to suspending the IBC for a period of time, the government has also raised the threshold of debt for initiation of the CIRP to 10 million rupees from the existing threshold of 100,000 rupees. It is relevant to highlight that this change is prospective in nature and, therefore, should not impact those creditors’ petitions that had already been filed before 24 March 2020.

Lastly, the government is also mulling over a special framework for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) that would enable MSMEs to initiate bankruptcy proceedings while remaining in control, in contrast to the ‘lenders in control’ philosophy of the IBC. At the time of writing, the framework has not been made public.

On 6 August 2020, the RBI issued a circular allowing companies a one-time restructuring (OTR) of loans without classifying them as non-performing assets. This mechanism has been made applicable for all commercial banks, cooperative banks, All India Financial Institutions and non-banking financial companies. The accounts that are eligible for an OTR are those that were classified as ‘standard’ and at the same time were not in default for more than 30 days as at 1 March 2020. The restructured framework needs to be invoked by 31 December 2020. For personal loans, it needs to be implemented within 90 days of the invocation date and for corporate loans, within 180 days of the invocation date. The invocation date will be the date on which the borrower and the lender agree to proceed on the OTR plan. As an additional measure, the RBI constituted an expert committee to suggest ways in which the restructuring can be implemented. The committee made recommendations for sector-specific financial parameters to be considered for the OTR. The recommendations, which have been broadly accepted by the RBI, were notified on 7 September 2020 by the RBI as guidelines for OTRs.

Trendsetting judicial developments

The COC’s control of corporate debtors and their decision-making upon commencement of the CIRP is the cornerstone of the IBC. The NCLAT’s decision in Essar Steel attempted to curtail the powers of the COC by circumscribing it with considerations of equity between different classes of creditors. The NCLAT’s decision was challenged and reversed by the Supreme Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel Limited v Satish Kumar Gupta. The judgment reinstated the primacy of the COC in approving the resolution plan and reinforced its position in K Sashidhar that the commercial wisdom of the COC cannot be challenged by the AA except on very limited grounds set forth under the IBC. In doing so, the Court also clarified that the COC is not acting in a fiduciary capacity for any class of creditors; it is merely taking a commercial decision by requisite majority. On the ‘fair and equitable’ distribution principle introduced through the 2019 Amendment, the Court clarified that it does not give the AA an additional ground to reject a resolution plan, as long as the interests of all classes of creditors have been looked into and taken care of.

Allowing a resolution applicant a clean slate, the Court allowed an IRP to record disputed claims on notional value to enable a resolution applicant to take the same into account in a resolution plan. The creditors of such disputed claims or those who fail to submit claims should not be able to reagitate their claims against a successful resolution applicant.

Finally, the Court held the 330-day timeline introduced through the 2019 Amendment to be merely advisory in nature, holding that the word ‘mandatorily’ is unconstitutional.

Another trendsetting judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited v Axis Bank Limited. The court was called upon to determine: (i) whether mortgages provided by Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL) for loans by its parent company, Jayprakash Associates Limited (JAL) were preferential transactions under section 43 of the IBC; and (ii) whether lenders of JAL could be classified as financial creditors of JIL by virtue of a security interest created by JIL. The Court held that the mortgages created by JIL for the benefit of JAL were preferential transactions, on the basis that: (i) while there was no creditor-debtor relationship between JIL and lenders of JAL, JAL was the ultimate beneficiary of such transactions; (ii) since JAL was the operational creditor of JIL, the transactions put JAL in an advantageous position, as otherwise it would have stood much lower in priority; and (iii) the transaction was not in the ordinary course of business as JIL could not be said to be in the business of offering security for its parent company. On the issue of whether lenders of JAL could claim to be financial creditors of JIL, the Court held that since JIL did not owe any sum of money to lenders of JAL, mere mortgages would not make such lenders financial creditors of JIL.

Throughout 2019, there was a string of orders, in which the NCLT and the NCLAT directed resolution professionals to allow schemes of arrangement and compromise under sections 230 to 232 of the Companies Act 2013, where a liquidation order had been passed. A number of promoters who were otherwise ineligible to submit a resolution plan in respect of the corporate debtors under section 29A of the Code saw this as a back-door entry to regain control. However, the NCLAT has clarified that a person who is ineligible in terms of section 29A of the Code cannot submit a scheme for compromise and arrangement in such cases. This move is seen as levelling the playing field and ensuring that dishonest promoters are not able to take control of the companies again. However, a Discussion Paper on Corporate Liquidation Process along with Draft Regulations dated 27 April 2019 issued by the IBBI had discussed this issue and concluded that, for the time being, the ineligibility should not be applied to compromise and arrangements under section 230.

Group insolvency

The IBC contemplates insolvency of companies on a standalone basis. Companies, by default, even if they are part of a larger conglomerate, are viewed as separate legal entities for the purposes of initiating insolvency proceedings against them. In isolated cases, AAs have ordered clubbing of insolvency proceedings of group companies for the purposes of hearings; however, no definite legal framework governing group insolvency exists in India. The IBBI had constituted a Working Group on Group Insolvency under the chairmanship of Mr U K Sinha to propose a legal framework within which group insolvency proceedings may be conducted in India. The Working Group submitted its report on 23 September 2019.

The Working Group recommended a cautious approach to implementing group insolvency regime, in a phased manner. It stressed the enabling and voluntary nature of the framework, recommending that with the exception of communication, cooperation and information sharing (among insolvency professionals, adjudicating authorities and committee of creditors of various group companies), no other provisions should be made mandatory. In the first phase, it was suggested that provisions relating to procedural coordination alone should be implemented. Procedural coordination could be achieved through joint application by group companies before an AA, the appointment of a single IRP and a common COC, and coordination between creditors of various group companies.

Meanwhile, various branches of the NCLT took the lead in some matters in consolidating insolvency proceedings of various group companies. For example, NCLT Mumbai consolidated insolvency proceedings of various group companies of Lavasa Group in Axis Bank Limited v Lavasa Corporation Limited, on the basis that the insolvency of the subsidiaries depended on the outcome of the insolvency of the parent company. Similarly, in the case of Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v Sachet Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, insolvencies of five group companies involved in developing a common township were consolidated by the NCLAT, in the interest of homebuyers. However, where group companies are self-sustainable and are not interlinked, courts have also denied consolidation. In the case of Videocon group companies, while NCLT Mumbai allowed consolidation of the insolvencies of 13 group entities, it disallowed the consolidation of two other group companies.

Cross-border insolvency

The Report of the Working Group on Cross-Border Insolvency had noted that the existing provisions in the IBC (sections 234 and 235) do not provide a comprehensive framework for cross-border insolvency matters. The proposal to provide a comprehensive framework for this purpose based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997 has been pending for some time now. It was initially believed that an amendment bill would be introduced in the Winter Session of Parliament in 2019.

While amendments to the IBC are awaited, the NCLAT advised a framework of cooperation between the administrator appointed by a Dutch court in respect of Jet Airways (having its regional hub in Amsterdam) and the resolution professional appointed by the AA in a petition filed by a financial creditor. The protocol was designed on the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law and provides a robust framework for cross-border coordination, maintaining respect for independent jurisdictions of the Dutch court and the NCLAT. Since Jet Airways was an Indian company with its centre of main interest in India, the IBC proceedings in India were the main insolvency proceedings and the Dutch proceedings were non-main proceedings.

In the case of Videocon Industries, the AA in India permitted the inclusion of the foreign assets held through other companies to be included in the resolution process. Further, the AA also declared that the moratorium under section 14 of the IBC is applicable to such foreign assets. However, in the absence of a clear framework, these matters have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion

Insofar as any legislation can have a transformative effect, the IBC has achieved that objective. Unlike its predecessor regimes, the IBC has been adopted well by the system and used in a manner that is maximising stakeholder value. The government has been proactive in ensuring that problems are dealt with and the courts have also (with the exception of some occasional stray orders) refrained from overturning the decisions of the COC. For international lenders and stakeholders, these are good tidings as they also point to the robustness of the Code to meet evolving challenges. It is hoped that once the covid-19 pandemic is dealt with substantially, the government will refocus its efforts on ensuring that the Code is implemented in earnest and made fully operational.

Subscribe here for related content, breaking news and market analysis from Global Restructuring Review.

Sign up to receive regular content emails featuring news and analysis on the key legal developments affecting cross-border restructuring and insolvency, for the lawyers and other professionals who work in this fast-paced world.

To view all formatting for this article (eg, tables, footnotes), please access the original here.

GRR is fully embedded in the global R&I community, providing relevant and readable daily news coverage straight to your inbox, as well as analysis of the latest hiring trends, key players, growth areas and emerging issues. Aside from industry news & updates, our platform helps restructuring and insolvency practitioners navigate the world’s complex R&I ecosystems with our technical library, research databases, and in-depth reviews of key jurisdictions – including a powerful comparative Q&A tool that provides rich detail on local laws and regulation.